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THE ASSAULT ON POSTCOMMUNIST COURTS 
 
%RMDQ%XJDULþDQGTom Ginsburg 
 
%RMDQ%XJDULþ is professor of law at the University of Ljubljana. He was a Fulbright Visiting 
Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, from 1998 to 2000, and a visiting 
researcher at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University in 2015. Tom Ginsburg is 
Deputy Dean and Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, where 
he also holds an appointment in the Political Science Department. His most recent book is 
Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory, with Nuno Garoupa (2015). The final version of this 
essay appears in the July 2016 issue of the Journal of Democracy. 
 
Less than two decades DIWHUWKHWULXPSKDQW³UHWXUQWR(XURSH,´the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) are facing a serious crisis of constitutional democracy. Following the 
example of Russia¶V³PDQDJHG´GHPRFUDF\DQHZIRUPRILOOLEHUDOregime is emerging in 
postcommunist Europe.1 In such regimes, political parties seek to capture the state for their own 
ideological or economic gains by dismantling key rule-of-law institutions. As in Moscow, the 
governments of these countries maintain the superficial appearance of democracy by holding 
elections, while seeking to undermine any institutional safeguards that could prevent them from 
maintaining power in perpetuity. Constitutional courts are central targets in these efforts. 
The populist and anti-liberal wave sweeping Central and Eastern Europe has featured 
assaults on the institutions that mediate between government and the people.2 Western 
democracies tend to be more successful at fending off attacks on liberal institutions because 
Western courts, media, human-rights organizations, and ombudsmen have longer and better-
developed traditions of independence and professionalism, and because these institutions 
mutually reinforce one another. Conversely, where such institutions are weak and 
underdeveloped, as they are in CEE countries, there is always the potential danger of a drift 
WRZDUG³LOOLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\,´ and even authoritarianism.  
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Today in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 
populist political movements, political parties, and governments claim to stand for ordinary 
citizens against corrupt elites. A corollary is the growing governmental disdain for rule of law, 
which has manifested most forcefully in the form of attacks against constitutional courts. In 
some countries, such as Hungary and Poland, new populist governments have managed fairly 
easily to render the courts toothless by packing them with loyalists and curtailing their 
independence. These governments have also reduced the independence of the mass media and 
the civil service by replacing journalists and civil servants with mediocre but loyal newcomers.  
Governments that distrust and disrespect liberal institutions often also attack the 
constitutionally granted rights and freedoms of Roma communities, Jews, and other ethnic 
minorities, as well as homosexuals. These groups fall outside an organic, ethnonationalist, 
culturally conservative concept of the political community. As a result, hate speech is fast 
becoming a lingua franca in Central and Eastern Europe, a region with long a long history of a 
particularly virulent form of xenophobic nationalism.  
All this is happening in member states of the European Union²signatories of the Treaty 
on the European Union (TEU, formerly the Maastricht Treaty), which declares in Article 2 that 
the EU represents a family of countries founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Yet prior to 1989, most CEE 
countries had little if any tradition of protecting human rights, particularly the rights of 
minorities.   
During the interwar years, dictatorial regimes gradually spread throughout the region²to 
Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In 
1920, the regency government of Hungarian dictator Admiral Miklós Horthy became the first in 
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Europe to enact anti-Jewish legislation. After World War II, communist rule in these same 
countries further eroded any remnants of the rule of law, substituting instead a ³VRFLDOLVW´
concept of legality that emphasized subservience of the law to political considerations. Thus 
when the transition from communism began in 1989, few CEE countries had the necessary 
FRQGLWLRQVIRUDUREXVW³SRO\DUFKLF´GHPRFUDF\: the rule of law, free media, and a vibrant civil 
society. Since then, of course, there has been massive external investment in fostering 
democratic institutions such as elections, political parties, and civil society in these countries.  
What is particularly troubling about the current moment is that the illiberal turn has been 
most pronounced in the democracies that were once considered to be the UHJLRQ¶Vmost 
advanced²namely, Hungary and Poland. In a relatively short time, Hungary has regressed from 
a consolidated democracy to a semi-authoritarian regimeZKLOH3RODQG¶VGHPRFUDF\KDV become 
illiberal with strong authoritarian overtones. What does this say about institutional reform as a 
way to lock in democracy? 
 
The Rise of the Courts 
The primary targets of the new illiberal regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are the 
constitutional courts. During the first quarter-century after the collapse of communism, 
constitutional courts became the UHJLRQ¶Vprimary defenders of the rule of law. The constitutional 
courts of Hungary and Poland, as well as those of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 
became extremely influential. Facilitated by help from outside organizations such as the Council 
RI(XURSH¶VVenice Commission (the European Commission for Democracy Through Law), 
these courts came to be important ³veto players´ in the politics of postcommunist Europe.  
4 
 
As the judgments handed down by constitutional courts began to gain widespread 
attention in legal and political circles, the courts rose to even greater prominence. Previously, 
legislatures had enjoyed almost absolute supremacy. The power of the courts to review the 
constitutionality of statutes, however, challenged that unchecked authority. For example, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, under the strong leadership of liberal former chief justice László 
Sólyom (1990±98), issued a series of decisions establishing its reputation as a guardian of 
political and social rights. The constitutional courts of Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania 
likewise robustly defended key constitutional principles and the basic rights enshrined in their 
respective postcommunist constitutions.  
In a landmark 1999 ruling, for example, the Slovenian Constitutional Court overturned 
legislation that had violated the rights of tens of thousands of people known as the ³erased.´ 
After declaring independence in 1991, Slovenia required residents with citizenship in other 
countries either to apply for Slovenian citizenship or to register as foreign residents. The almost 
twenty-thousand people who failed WRGRVREHIRUHWKHFRXQWU\¶VILUVWHOHFWLRQLQ were 
³erased´ from the register of permanent residents. Many of the erased lost their jobs, health 
insurance, drivHU¶V licenses, passports, and even their homes. Some were deported, while others 
remained in the country but did not legally exist. The 1999 ruling declaring the law 
unconstitutional was the first step toward rectifying this situation. 
 This role for the courts is relatively new. Before the 1950s, judicial review was virtually 
unknown anywhere in Europe. In a famous 1930s legal debate, German political theorist Carl 
Schmitt, a leading jurist of the Third Reich, argued that the only real safeguard for democracy 
was a leader (Führer). ,Q6FKPLWW¶Vversion of democracy, there was no place for liberal 
institutions such as constitutional courts. Hans Kelsen, a top Austrian jurist, criticized Schmitt, 
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arguing that only an independent constitutional court could protect democracy from its 
weaknesses.3 6FKPLWW¶VFRQFHSWSUHYDLOHGLQZDUWLPH(XURSHAustria and Czechoslovakia were 
the only countries in Europe to establish constitutional courts before the war. After the Anschluss 
in 1938, however, the Austrian court was shut down, and Kelsen, who had Jewish ancestry, was 
forced to emigrate.  
After the war, .HOVHQ¶VSRVLWLRQVIRXQGZLGHVSUHDGIDYRU Beginning with Germany, 
most countries in Europe established constitutional courts, primarily as a response to the collapse 
of democracies before and during the war. In the early postwar years, exiled German political 
scientist Karl Loewenstein developed the concept of ³PLOLWDQWGHPRFUDF\.´4 In Loewenstein¶V
view, the dark legacy of Nazism and fascism showed democrac\¶s inability to fend off 
authoritarian movements. To compensate for that weakness, Loewenstein urged democracies to 
take preemptive legal measures against antidemocratic forces²for example, to ban 
antidemocratic political parties, to forbid the formation of private paramilitary armies, and to 
prohib the ostentatious wearing of political uniforms.5  
These core components of militant democracy were enshrined in *HUPDQ\¶V new basic 
law of 1949, along with the Federal Constitutional Court, which later banned the Communist 
Party and the Socialist Reich Party (founded in 1949 as a successor to the Nazi Party). Since 
then, the German court and other West European constitutional courts have become prominent 
political actors with significant influence over national policy. Their power and prestige, 
however, have never been challenged as strongly as in postcommunist Europe, where the very 
survival of such bodies today is under threat by the court-packing plans of proto-authoritarian 
and populist governments. There, a new generation of autocratic leaders is directly attacking and 
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dismantling the constitutional courts, often invoking arguments alarmingly similar to those of 
Schmitt.  
Do the constitutional courts of postcommunist Europe have the capacity to protect 
constitutional democracy, as envisaged by Loewenstein and the framers of the postwar German 
constitutional order? Before the Nazis came to power in Germany, judges had been celebrated 
for developing an early form of the Rechtsstaat (legal state). Yet they did not even try to 
challenge Hitler¶VVXSUHPDF\In a 1936 essay, Lowenstein pointed out that a judge would have 
to be very reckless to challenge Nazi ordinances on legal grounds, and noted that that he knew of 
no such judge.6 On the contrary, the blessing of the German judges, which stabilized the judicial 
system, was instrumental in legitimizing the Nazi regime.   
The new populist governments in Hungary and Poland quickly identified constitutional 
courts as ³obstacles´ to their plans. Gaining the blessing of powerful courts for controversial 
initiatives required manipulation and intimidation. The developments in Hungary under the 
government of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party have been the most radical and worrisome. 
Between 2010 and 2015, the Fidesz government drastically revised the Hungarian constitutional 
and political order by systematically dismantling checks and balances, thereby undermining the 
rule of law and transforming the country from a postcommunist democratic success story into an 
illiberal regime. With a series of constitutional amendments that culminated in a new constitution 
in 2012, the Fidesz government rendered the constitutional court virtually powerless. The 
government first changed the rules for nominating judges to the Constitutional Court so that 
Fidesz could use its two-thirds majority to nominate its own candidates. Next, the government 
restricted the court¶s jurisdiction over fiscal matters. After that, it increased the number of judges 
from eight to fifteen, filling the seven new positions with handpicked Fidesz loyalists.  
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The worst blow to the court, however, was the Fourth Amendment to the 2012 Constitution, 
which repealed all Constitutional Court decisions made before 1 January 2012, when the new 
constitution entered into force. As a result, precedent based on earlier decisions can no longer be 
invoked in new cases. The Fourth Amendment also bans the court from reviewing constitutional 
amendments for substantive conflicts with constitutional principles; the court is allowed only to 
review the procedural validity of new amendments. In essence, the Fourth Amendment is the Orbán 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHYHQJH´IRU several of the ³ORVVHV´ that it incurred in earlier court 
decisions, as well as for the insistence of EU bodies that it modify certain controversial rules. For 
now, +XQJDU\¶V once-powerful and highly respected Constitutional Court has effectively 
disappeared from the political scene, erased as quickly as the Slovenian citizens whose registration 
was eliminated by their government. 
 
The Case of Poland 
In Poland, the government of the far-right populist Law and Justice party (PiS), elected in 
October 2015, has set off down the path of Hungary. Almost overnight, Prime Minister Beata 
6]\GáR¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQSDFNHG3RODQG¶V Constitutional Tribunal with five handpicked judges 
and refused to swear in the three judges who had been properly appointed by the previous 
government. In December 2015, the PiS-controlled parliament passed an amendment to the 
Constitutional Tribunal Act. Known as the ³Uepair ELOO´WKHDPHQGPHQW reorganizes the fifteen-
judge tribunal, requiring a two-thirds majority for any decision to be binding and raising the 
quorum for hearing a case from nine to thirteen. As there are currently only twelve judges on the 
tribunal, the new rules prevent it from annulling PiS-backed legislation. Moreover, the repair bill 
seems to be custom-made to paralyze the court. The bill requires cases to remain on the docket 
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for at least six months before they are decided. The bill also gives the lower house of parliament 
(the Sejm) WKHSRZHUWRWHUPLQDWHDMXGJH¶s mandate, which impinges upon judicial 
independence.  
The first time the PiS was in power, from 2005 to 2007, the tribunal blocked a number of 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V plans. In May 2007, the tribunal invalidated several key sections of 3RODQG¶V 
lustration law, which governs the participation of former communists in government and the civil 
service. Angered by the ruling, then±prime minister Jarosáaw KaczyĔski threatened to charge the 
judges for having acted ³improperly.´ Today, as the ruling SDUW\¶V de facto leader, .DF]\ĔVNL 
has, LQDOHJDO³EOLW]NULHJ´ defanged the tribunal, leaving it largely impotent. When the PiS 
announced its plan to curb the WULEXQDO¶Vpowers, Lech WaáĊsa, WKHFRXQWU\¶VILUVWSUHVLGHQW 
warned that Polish democracy was in peril.  
In March 2016, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal unexpectedly struck back, declaring 
the repair bill to be in violation of the constitution. In DGHFLVLRQWKDWGHHSHQV3RODQG¶s 
constitutional crisis, the tribunal ruled that the reorganization called for by the repair bill 
SUHYHQWHGWKHWULEXQDOIURPZRUNLQJ³UHOLDEO\DQGHIILFLHQWO\´6KRUWO\DIWHUZDUG3RODQG¶s 
Supreme Court WKHFRXQWU\¶VKLJKHVWDSSHOODWHFRXUWpassed a resolution stating that the rulings 
of the Constitutional Tribunal should be respected, despite its stalemate with the government. 
The government, however, announced that it would ignore the tribunal¶V repair-bill ruling and 
refused to publish it in the official Gazette, as required by the constitution. An enraged 
.DF]\ĔVNLDGGUHVVHGWKH Sejm, condemning both high courts for opposing reforms passed by 
SDUOLDPHQW³[We] will not permit anarchy in Poland,´ .DF]\ĔVNL GHFODUHG³even if it is 
SURPRWHGE\WKHFRXUWV´7 The tribunal most likely will survive this standoff with the 
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government, but, as Adam Bodnar of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights points out, it 
remains to be seen ZKHWKHUWKHFRXUW¶V ³IXQFWLRQZLOOQRWEHSXUHO\GHFRUDWLYH´8 
It seems that a constitutional court alone is relatively weak against a powerful 
government determined to dismantle basic rule-of-law institutions, as in Hungary and Poland. In 
such a circumstance, there is little a constitutional court can do to stop the authoritarian drift. In 
retrospect, we see that the postcommunist reformers who put their faith in the courts were naïve. 
Constitutional courts and other rule-of-law institutions in Central and Eastern Europe always 
lacked the necessary support of genuinely liberal political parties and programs, leaving the 
courts vulnerable to attacks from populists.  
During the early postcommunist period, a court-centered, rights-based, and depoliticized 
concept of constitutional democracy prevailed. Accordingly, constitutional courts and other 
nonpolitical bodies²such as independent agencies, central banks, and the like²emerged as the 
key agents of the constitutional transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Paul Blokker 
observes WKDW³SDUWLFLSDWRU\GLPHQVLRQVSRSXODUGHPRFUDF\DQGFLYLOVRFLHW\SURPRWLRQHYHQLI
certainly not wholly absent from constitutions in the region, seem then to ultimately have an only 
secondary priority in constLWXWLRQDOKLHUDUFKLHV´9 Thus legal constitutionalism, as practiced in 
Central and Eastern Europe, has a built-in paradox: While it tried to build the rule-of-law 
institutions needed to curb the excesses of the majority will, it simultaneously weakened such 
institutions by neglecting to elicit broader political support for their actions. 
Today, three of the four Visegrád countries are ruled by populist parties that openly flout 
the rule of law and liberal democratic values. In Slovakia, populist prime minister Robert Fico, 
leader of Direction±Social Democracy (Smer-SD), was reelected in March 2016 after 
campaigning on an anti-migrant platform. In order to form a majority government, he needed 
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coalition partners. Two of them, the Slovak National Party (SNP) and the Siet Party, are from the 
far right, and a third, the Most-Híd party, represents the Hungarian minority. In a surprising 
development, the neo-Nazi People¶s Party±Our Slovakia won parliamentary seats for the first 
time. Party leader Marian Kotleba previously headed the Slovak Togetherness±National Party, a 
neo-Nazi formation that, prior to its forced dissolution by the Constitutional Court, organized 
anti-Roma rallies and expressed sympathy for SlovakLD¶V wartime Nazi-puppet state. Given the 
nature of 6PHU¶VFRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUV and the improving electoral fortunes of right-wing fringe 
groups, it will come as little surprise LI)LFR¶V new government follows in the footsteps of 
Hungary and Poland, extending ³LOOLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\´ further into postcommunist Europe.  
 
The EU to the Rescue? 
Some observers argue that the existence of international organizations such as the 
European Union makes the court-packing currently underway in EU member states quite 
different from the ³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRXSV´ of earlier eras.10 One of the most crucial political 
questions facing Europe today is how well the EU is equipped, legally and politically, to defend 
democracy and the rule of law in its member states. It is therefore necessary to examine how the 
EU is managing its first real attempts at safeguarding democracy within member states.  
A political club of democratic regimes established primarily to promote peace and 
prosperity in postwar Europe, the EU must now confront member states that are turning away 
from liberal democracy. The European Commission, the executive body responsible for 
upholding the legal order of the EU, began infringement proceedings against Hungary in 2012, 
claiming that the new Hungarian constitutional order contradicted the ³fundamental values´ 
(democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights) laid out in Article 2 of the Treaty of 
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the European Union. And in January 2016, the European Commission launched an official 
inquiry into 3RODQG¶VSRVVLEOHviolations of EU standards, using the newly adopted Rule of Law 
Framework, a three-stage process designed to address potential systemic threats to the rule of 
law within member states.  
EU law currently offers three legal options for dealing with cases such as those of 
Hungary and Poland. The first is to invoke Article 7 of the TEU, the so-called nuclear option, 
which lays out a procedure for determining whether a member state has violated the values stated 
in Article 2 and, if so, allows for the suspension of certain rights. This provision was first 
introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (amending the 1992 Maastricht Treaty), which 
staWHVWKDWLQFDVHVZKHUHWKHUHKDVEHHQD³VHULRXVDQGSHUVLVWHQWEUHDFK´RIWKH³SULQFLSOHVRI
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,´ the 
&RXQFLORIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQFDQ³VXVSHQGFHUWDLQ. . . rights . . . including the voting rights of 
WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWRIWKDW0HPEHU6WDWHLQWKH&RXQFLO´  
Although Hungary has clearly violated Article 2, the institutions of the EU such as the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union have 
yet to use Article 7 to sanction Hungary. The European Parliament contemplated doing so in July 
2013, when it adopted the Tavares Report (named for its rapporteur, Portuguese MEP Rui 
Tavares), which harshly criticized the state of fundamental rights in Hungary and recommended 
setting up an independent mechanism to monitor rights-related developments. This met with stiff 
resistance from the European People¶s Party (EPP), a coalition of center-right European political 
parties that constitutes the largest bloc in the European Parliament. Fidesz belongs to the EPP, 
and Orbán has many friends among its members. Consequently, it is doubtful that either the 
Parliament or the Council would be willing to resort to imposing sanctions.  
12 
 
The only time that EU political leaders have verged on taking such a drastic measure was 
in 2000, after -|UJ+DLGHU¶V right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), considered to be a 
[HQRSKRELFDQGUDFLVWRUJDQL]DWLRQMRLQHG$XVWULD¶V coalition government. Ultimately, EU heads 
of state, led by FrDQFH¶V3resident Jacques Chirac, chose not to invoke Article 7 and opted 
instead to coordinate bilateral sanctions²suspending contact with the Austrian government, 
denying support to Austrian applicants for positions in international organizations, and reducing 
contact with Austrian ambassadors. Such a move was unprecedented, and the sanctions regime 
lasted for seven months.  
<HW$XVWULD¶VFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWKDGQRW explicitly violated any EU rules. Without the 
appropriate legal basis and without the support of the European Commission and the Council of 
the European Union, the two key EU institutions, the sanctions were doomed to fail. Given that 
the coalition government technically had done nothing wrong, it would seem that the sanctions 
ZHUHSURYRNHGSULPDULO\E\+DLGHU¶VLQFHQGLDU\UKHWRULFDQGFPÖ positions minimizing or even 
glorifying certain features of $XVWULD¶V1D]L past. Today, it is widely believed that imposing 
sanctions on Austria in 2000 was highly questionable, both legally and politically.   
The (8¶Vsecond legal option for dealing with countries veering off the democratic path 
is detailed in Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Article 258 VWDWHVWKDWLIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQILQGVWKDWDPHPEHUVWDWHKDV³IDLOHGWRIXOILO
an obligation under the Treaties´DQGWKDWVWDWHWKHQIDLOVWR rectify the matter, the Commission 
³may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU].´ This is what 
happened in the case of Hungary.  
Using Article 258, the Commission initiated several separate suits against Hungary on 
more narrow legal grounds. The most interesting case involved a provision in +XQJDU\¶V 
13 
 
Transitional Act on the implementation of the 2012 Constitution, which lowered the retirement 
age of judges from 70 to 62. This provision would have forced 274 judges and public prosecutors 
into retirement in a short period of time. The Commission considered the rule to be a violation of 
the independence of the judiciary. 
The most problematic aspect of this new provision was that the judges forced to retire 
included most of the FRXQWU\¶V court presidents, who assign cases. Although the 2012 
Constitution includes other provisions that are even more troubling in terms of judicial 
independence, the Commission decided to utilize very narrow legal grounds to deal with the 
case: It relied exclusively on Council Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment, 
which prohibits discrimination on grounds of age. In November 2012, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) ruled that the radical lowering of the retirement age for Hungarian judges 
constituted age discrimination and violated Council Directive 2000/78/EC.11  
Despite this legal victory, the retired judges were never comprehensively reinstated, and 
Fidesz loyalists basically stayed in place. As Jan-Werner Müller argues, LQWKHHQG³Europe 
appeared impotent in getting at the real issue, which was political and had nothing to do with the 
discrimination [against] individuals.´12 Separate legal proceedings such as this discrimination 
suit may yield important legal victories, but they ultimately fail to address the broader 
institutional issues that threaten the foundations of the rule of law and liberal democracy in 
Hungary.  
7KHILQDORSWLRQLQWKH(8¶VOHJDODUVHQDOLVWKHaforementioned Rule of Law Framework. 
The framework was adopted in 2014, mainly in response to the inability of the key EU actors to 
agree on invoking Article 7. Often called the ³pre±Article 7 procedure,´ the Rule of Law 
Framework complements Article 7 by HVWDEOLVKLQJDVWUXFWXUHG³SUHSDUDWRU\´SKDVHfor taking 
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Article 7 actions. The Commission first assesses whether there is a systemic threat to the rule of 
law in a specific country. It then sends a ³rule-of-law opinion´ to the member state in question as 
a basis for dialogue to resolve the issue. If that member state ignores the opinion, the 
Commission then issues D³rule-of-law recommendation´ and monitors WKHFRXQWU\¶V follow-up. 
If ultimately unsatisfied ZLWKWKHFRXQWU\¶VUHVSRQVH, the Commission may decide to activate 
Article 7.  
The FUDPHZRUN¶VJUHDWHVWVKRUWFRPLQJis that it offers little in the way of viable 
sanctions that can be used before the activation of Article 7. When Poland was investigated 
under the Framework in 2016, Prime Minister Szydáo made it clear that her government was not 
worried about the inquiry. Moreover, she did not shy away from expressing strong contempt 
toward %UXVVHOV¶DFWLRQFDOOLQJWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQDQ³LGHRORJLFDOWKUHDW´WR3RODQG¶Vnational 
sovereignty.13   
In April, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging Poland¶V government to 
UHVSHFWWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQDO7ULEXQDO,I3RODQG¶VJovernment refuses to 
FRPSO\ZLWKWKHUHVROXWLRQ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQFDQPRYHon to the 
next step of the Framework, which is to UHFRPPHQG³WKDWWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVROYHV [sic] the 
SUREOHPVLGHQWLILHGZLWKLQDIL[HGWLPHOLPLW´1RWVXUSULVLQJO\WZR3L6PHPEHUVRIWKH
European Parliament immediately announced that the Polish government would not follow the 
UHVROXWLRQ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV 
For now, it seems as though little can be expected from EU legal actions aimed at 
protecting the rule of law in member states. :ULWLQJDERXW³VXEQDWLRQDODXWKRULWDULDQLVP´Daniel 
.HOHPHQDUJXHVWKDW³OHJDOOHYHUVDORQHDUHXQOLNHO\WRVDIHJXDUGGHPRFUDF\. . . . So long as 
political leaders are willing to put partisan interests above democratic values, they may allow . . . 
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autocracy to persist for decades within otherwise democratic political systems.´14 This holds true 
at the supranational (EU) and national (member states) levels as well. It will take bold political 
action on the part of other EU member states to defend core EU values more effectively. 
 
From Courts to Politics? 
One of the problems with Framework on the Rule of Law and Article 7 TEU is that they 
allow the EU only to issue recommendations and to suspend voting rights in the Council, with no 
steps in between. Suspending voting rights can be a risky move. In the case of Hungary, doing so 
could easily alienate the Orbán government from the EU, pushing it further LQWR5XVVLD¶Vsphere 
of influence. At the same time, while a voting-rights suspension sends a powerful message, it is a 
mostly symbolic measure, particularly for smaller, less influential EU members such as Hungary.  
Article 7 would likely be far more effective if it included the possibility of economic 
sanctions, which would weigh heavily on a country such as Hungary that is heavily dependent on 
EU structural funds. In 2012, Orbán declared that Hungary ³Zill not be a colony´ of the EU. But 
he had no qualms about signing a a six-year budget agreement with the EU that will provide 
nearly US$40 billion in aid for Hungary (whose annual GDP is $125 billion), between 2014 and 
2020. Poland also benefits substantially from EU aid. On 5 October 2014, the New York Times 
reported that Poland (whose 2013 GDP was $518 billion), would receive a total of $318 billion 
in EU aid between 2008 and 2020. This is more than two times the present-day value of the 
Marshall Plan. The annual average accorded to each Marshall Plan recipient for four years was 
$2.5 billion. By 2020, Poland will be receiving $26.5 billion per year.  
 These aid deals should be a great source of leverage for the EU. Yet studies suggest that 
economic sanctions seldom work. In the case of the EU, a big reason why ³economic sanctions 
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have fallen short in the past is that not all countries have complied. Indeed, significant 
GLIIHUHQFHVRIGRPHVWLFRSLQLRQLQWKHLPSRVLQJFRXQWU\RIWHQXQGHUPLQHVDQFWLRQVDVZHOO´15 
Therefore, future attempts at imposing economic sanctions should be backed by a strong regional 
consensus. In light of current events, however, achieving consensus is no small task. Even the 
EU institutions themselves have not agreed on a common language to describe the Hungarian 
and Polish cases. The EU¶V flawed approach to Hungary KDVDOUHDG\GDPDJHGWKH8QLRQ¶V
political legitimacy, while the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, WKHWKUHDWRI³%UH[LW´ and 
Russia¶V occupation of Crimea and other parts of Ukraine have left the EU more politically 
divided than ever before. Needless to say, in such a fragile union, consensus on sanctions may 
remain elusive.  
Like other international organizations, the EU is more likely to exert pressure on a 
member state when foreign interests are at stake; it is less likely to intervene over matters of 
GRPHVWLFSROLF\DQG³the internal functioning of democracy, such as curtailment of press 
freedoms, corruption in public administration, and the centralization of power in the hands of the 
ruling party,´16 LQSDUWEHFDXVHLWLVLQWKH(8¶VLQWHUHVWWRPDLQWDLQVWDELOLW\DQGDOVREHFDXVHWKH
issue of national sovereignty is delicate. While the EU has made massive encroachments on the 
fiscal sovereignty of member states (with the Fiscal Compact, the European Stability 
0HFKDQLVPDQGWKH³VL[SDFN´RIILYHUHJXODWLRQVDQGRQHGLUHFWLYH, it is more reluctant to 
impinge on national sovereignty when it comes to more sensitive social or political matters.  
This contrast between fiscal and sociopolitical measures reflects the limits of EU 
integration toward a stronger political union. The EU institutions and elites seem to lack the 
enthusiasm and political will for protecting fundamental values such as democracy and the rule 
of law that they displayed when dealing with the Eurozone crisis. Otherwise, Article 7 already 
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would have been used in the Hungarian case. Yet, with trust in the EU at an all-time low and EU 
political elites unwilling to acknowledge the gravity of the Hungarian and Polish problems, it 
seems unlikely in any case that sanctions would have achieved the desired results. 
Nevertheless, the EU is not completely powerless when it comes to defending the rule of 
law in its member states. Despite its failure to prevent the drift toward authoritarianism in 
Hungary, the European Union has shown elsewhere that it can protect democracy and the rule of 
law in member states. During Romania¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFULVLVIRUH[DPSOHWKH(8TXLFNO\
threatened the country with serious penalties, including blocking its accession to the Schengen 
free-movement zone. This pressure from the EU succeeded in getting Romania¶V Prime Minister 
Victor Ponta to back down from his attacks on the Romanian Constitutional Court and from his 
campaign to impeach his rival, President Traian Băsescu.17 
7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQVKRXOGDFWMXVWDVTXLFNO\DQGIRUFHIXOO\DJDLQVW3RODQG¶VFXUUHQW
government²before the PiS consolidates its grip on power as Fidesz has already done in 
Hungary. The Romanian example also shows that, in certain political situations, constitutional 
courts can help to check the authoritarian aspirations of powerful populist leaders²as when 
5RPDQLD¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUW invalidated the %ăVHVFX-impeachment referendum for failing to 
reach the vote threshold. Of course, 3RQWD¶VJRYHUQPHQWwas much less hegemonic than OrbáQ¶V
or 6]\GáR¶s, and the EU had more powerful sanctions available for dealing with Romania, as 
membership conditionalities make for better bargaining chips than political penalties. Timing 
seems to be critical too. If the EU acts early, before an illiberal government consolidates power, 
the chances of preventing a slide into autocracy are much greater.  
This argues for immediate and forceful action in support of 3RODQG¶V Constitutional 
Tribunal. It is worth noting that U.S. secretary of state John Kerry and three U.S. senators told 
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their 3ROLVKFRXQWHUSDUWVWKDWWKHOHJDOFKDQJHVEURXJKWE\WKHQHZJRYHUQPHQW³XQGHUPLQH
3RODQG¶VUROHDVDGHPRFUDWLFPRGHO.´18 It is also important that external sanctions find strong 
domestic support within Poland from opposition political parties and civil society groups. On 19 
December 2015, roughly twenty-thousand people rallied in Warsaw to protest the new 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDQWLGHPRFUDWic actions; a week earlier, fifty thousand had marched through the city 
to protest the PiS government. These demonstrations offer a glimmer of hope for Polish 
democracy. The protesters, led by the Committee for the Defence of Democracy, demanded the 
protection of freedom and democracy. The JURXS¶s actions were supported by several famous 
Polish artists and intellectuals, including Agnieszka Holland and Andrzej Wajda.  
In 1957, just three years after the U.S. Supreme Court¶V landmark Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, U.S. political scientist Robert Dahl wrote that the court aORQH³is almost 
powerless to affect the course of national policy.´19 'DKO¶VREVHUYDWLRQUHPDLQs widely accepted 
in the United States today. Some political scientists argue that despite the enormous power of 
high-court justices³WKHLUGHFLVLRQVFDQHQMR\ORQJ-term and sometimes even short-term efficacy 
only insofar as those decisions remain politically tolerable to Congress and the [president@´20  
In contrast, expectations about the power of constitutional courts in Europe have been 
much higher, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. In many CEE countries, the courts 
have played a major role in building constitutional democracy and have served as symbols of the 
rule of law. Yet the last few years have exposed the institutional fragility of constitutional courts 
when they are targeted by illiberal forces. Without quick and sustained pressure from the EU, the 
dismantling of the hard-fought freedoms associated with the rule of law will continue, and 
Central and Eastern Europe may again grow to resemble Russia more than the West. More 
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broadly, we may be forced to question the capacity of the courts to protect democracy from 
illiberal majorities.  
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